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EPA has the authority to ban pesticides to reduce health risks to consumers from food
residues. Such bans in
uence the price of fruits and vegetables, and the resulting consump-
tion shifts impact consumer health. We develop a framework to compare the direct and
indirect health eects of pesticide regulation, and investigate the distribution of these eects
across social groups. Under some plausible scenarios, the increased incidence of disease from
reduced fruit and vegetable consumption outweigh the direct benets of regulation. Fur-
thermore, high income consumers receive the greatest direct health benet from pesticide
cancellations, whereas low and medium income consumers are most hurt by the resulting
dietary changes.
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s
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1 Introduction
Pesticide regulation in the United States is focused in large part on the carcinogenic risks
posed by pesticide residues on food, as determined by laboratory animal tests. Since these
policies are designed to protect human health, it is a worthwhile question to consider whether
the implementation of a pesticide ban gives rise to any countervailing risks that partially
oset the benets of the ban. In this study we investigate the health risks that result from
producers' and consumers' economic responses to such bans. It is important to note that we
are not directly addressing those actions undertaken primarily for protection of agricultural
workers or the environment, although this analysis has implications for any policies that may
aect food prices.
Regulators have generally paid attention to the direct benets of banning a pesticide
use, which lowers the public's exposure to residue of that target pesticide. Some attention
has been given in the regulatory process to the risks posed by those chemicals that may be
used in place of a banned pesticide, but the risks that raised by economic responses to the
regulations have generally not been considered (Ralston, 1999). This is despite statutory
justication for taking these eects into account; changes to the pesticide laws under the
1996 Food Quality Protection Act (FQPA) allow the setting of tolerances that would not
otherwise meet the prevailing safety standard if \use of the pesticide prevents even greater
health risks to consumers or the lack of the pesticide would result in a signicant disruption
in domestic production of an adequate, wholesome, and economical food supply" (United
States Environmental Protection Agency, Oce of Pesticide Programs, 1999).Health Tradeos in Pesticide Regulation 2
It is generally true that removing a pesticide from the production process will result in
an increase in the price of the treated commodity (Zilberman, Schmitz, Casterline, Licht-
enberg and Siebert, 1991; Ralston, 1999). If consumers respond to the increased prices by
reducing consumption of the aected fruits and vegetables (and perhaps shifting consump-
tion to less nutritious foods), they will lose the health benets associated with the change in
consumption. This study illustrates the magnitude of some of these tradeos. In addition,
the people most aected by dietary changes may be dierent from those who receive the
greatest direct health benet from the pesticide regulation. We therefore also investigate the
income distribution of these health eects.
2 Health-based Regulation of Pesticides
Federal involvement in the regulation of pesticides dates back to 1910, when Congress passed
the Insecticide Act, prohibiting the sale of fraudulently labelled pesticides (Brown et al.,
2000). It was not until 1964, however, that Congress empowered the executive branch to ban
a pesticide on the basis of potential hazard to the public. Since 1972, protecting farmworker
and consumer safety has been the primary focus of pesticide regulation, as carried out by the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). In
this study the focus is on consumer safety protections.
Under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA), EPA is responsible for
setting a pesticide residue tolerance for food crops and products. For new products, EPA
either sets a tolerance and registers the pesticide under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide,
and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), or denies the registration request, eectively banning the
substance from commercial use. Similarly, EPA can ban substances currently in use if new
toxicological data suggests that the pesticide may pose a signicant health risk.
The establishment of these product-specic tolerance levels is driven mainly by evidence
of carcinogenic and other toxic eects in laboratory animal tests. If these experiments ndHealth Tradeos in Pesticide Regulation 3
that a pesticide causes a statistically signicant increase in tumors in the test animals, EPA
uses quantitative risk assessment to estimate the potential cancer risk for humans. The risks
are expressed as the probability of developing cancer after a lifetime of exposure, e.g., one in
1,000,000 or one in 10,000 (Gray and Hammitt, 2000). Although there is no one acceptable
risk level, EPA is required to set tolerances that are \safe," dened as \a reasonable cer-
tainty that no harm will result from aggregate exposure to the pesticide chemical residue"
(United States Environmental Protection Agency, Oce of Pesticide Programs, 1999).1 In
the absence of carcinogenic eects in laboratory animals, the tolerances are based upon the
highest dose at which no toxic eects were observed in animal tests, which is then divided
by a safety factor (usually 10 or 100) to determine an acceptable daily dose for humans.
There has been considerable controversy over the applicability of laboratory animal tests
to determining cancer risks in humans. Detractors argue that the testing method itself, and
not simply exposure to the pesticide in question, may often be responsible for observed car-
cinogenic eects in animals (Ames and Gold, 1997). Similarly, some deem the establishment
of tolerances of non-carcinogenic compounds by dividing a dose observed to be harmless in
small mammals by a safety factor to be overly cautious. Even if the resulting standards
are more protective than are necessary to assure the public health and this comes at an
increased cost to consumers, producers, and/or regulators, such an approach can be justied
on \safety-rst" or \precautionary principle" grounds if the regulatory measure does not
give rise to osetting health risks. Indeed, \when examining the risk and benets of a pes-
ticide, EPA typically assumes that revoking the registration of the pesticide will eliminate
the associated risks to human health and the environment" (Gray and Hammitt, 2000).
1Prior to the 1996 FQPA amendments to the FFDCA and FIFRA, EPA was required to establish toler-
ances that would \protect the public health." Although the FQPA was to establish a single, health-based
standard for all pesticide residues, this refers to eliminating dierent protection levels based on how the food
is processed or when the pesticide was rst registered for use; it does not refer to a uniform level of risk
tolerance.Health Tradeos in Pesticide Regulation 4
3 Trading One Risk for Another
The wisdom of applying the precautionary principle to the evaluation and control of cancer
risk from a pesticide becomes less obvious, however, in the presence of countervailing risks.
Farmers will typically replace banned pesticides with other compounds or pest control tech-
niques, and these substitutes may carry risks of their own. Additionally, if substitutes are
less eective in controlling the target pest than the original substance was, there may be
increased human health hazards from the higher pest population. In the case of fungicides,
the pest of interest may itself be carcinogenic to humans. There is likewise no guarantee that
a standard designed to lower human cancer risk will also be protective of the environment, or
vice-versa. A human versus ecological health trade-o may have been made when DDT was
banned by the EPA in 1972. Although DDT is persistent in the environment and threatened
wildlife, the organophosphate pesticides that were used by many farmers to replace DDT
are more acutely toxic and resulted in increased incidents of farmworker poisoning. The
unavailability of DDT for use against malaria-bearing insects may have also contributed to
the increased incidence of that disease in recent decades (Gray and Hammitt, 2000).
It is also possible that current pesticide regulations are trading one risk to consumers for
another. As described in Section 4 below, there is an extensive body of research showing the
health benets of consuming fruits and vegetables. Such ndings suggest that a reduction of
fruit and vegetable consumption resulting from an increase in commodity prices may result in
nontrivial health eects. Although in this paper we are focusing on changes in the incidence
of certain outcomes, it is important to keep in mind that there are substantial associated
costs as well. The USDA estimates that healthier diets might prevent $71 billion per annum
in medical costs, productivity losses, and premature deaths (Fraz~ ao, 1999).
Economists and political scientists have been writing about risk tradeos in public policy
for over twenty years. Lave (1981) pointed out that competing policies often dier, and
can be compared, by the risks they entail. Wildavsky (1979) is credited with formalizingHealth Tradeos in Pesticide Regulation 5
the concept that when society attempts to control risks, it diverts resources that could be
used for other productive purposes. In recent years, researchers at the AEI-Brookings Joint
Center for Regulatory Studies, the Harvard Center for Risk Analysis, and elsewhere have
generated a large body of work in the eld of \Risk Tradeo Analysis." A recent book on
the topic covers such diverse topics as elderly drivers, automobile fuel-eciency standards,
and the treatment of schizophrenia (Graham and Wiener, 1995b). Such research has in turn
contributed to the highly politicized debate on the proper role of government.
Graham and Wiener (1995a) have developed a useful typology for consideration of risk
tradeos, summarized in Table 1 below. They rst distinguish between the \target risk"
that a government policy seeks to reduce, and a \countervailing risk" that may arise as an
unintended consequence of the policy. They also pay attention to who experiences the risks,
noting that sometimes countervailing risks may be faced by the same people who face the
target risk, and sometimes these may be dierent groups. When a risky outcome is shifted
from one group to another, this is termed a \risk transfer," and when the same outcome is
created in the target population, it is labelled a \risk oset." When one adverse outcome is
replaced by another within the same population, this is \risk substitution," and when the
countervailing risk gives rise to dierent negative outcomes in a dierent population, this
is called a \risk transformation." The potential adverse eects of pesticide regulation from
decreased fruit and vegetable consumption falls under the categories of \risk substitution"
and \risk transformation" in this classication scheme.
Table 1: Typology of Risk Tradeos (Graham and Wiener, 1995a)
Compared to the Target Risk, the Countervailing Risk is:
SAME TYPE DIFFERENT TYPE
Compared to the SAME Risk Risk
Target Risk, the POPULATION Oset Substitution
Countervailing DIFFERENT Risk Risk
Risk aects: POPULATION Transfer TransformationHealth Tradeos in Pesticide Regulation 6
Other authors have previously noted the possible indirect eects of federal pesticide
programs. Ralston (1999) includes pesticide regulation in her review of government policies
that in
uence consumer's dietary choices, noting that restrictions may increase price, while
the existence of such programs aect consumer condence in the food supply. Goddard
(2002) discusses the public health benets of pesticides, arguing that pesticides are necessary
tools in the ght against infectious diseases, particularly given the modern capability for rapid
travel from one region of the world to another. Gray and Graham (1995) follow the typology
described above to discuss the types of risk tradeos that may arise in pesticide regulation.
Their list of possible tradeos includes acute toxicity to farmworkers resulting from substitute
pesticides, non-cancer and cancer toxicity to consumers arising from substitutes, risks from
natural toxins in foods, risks from changes in diet, and mortality induced by decreases in
income. A later study by Gray and Hammitt (2000) extends this analysis to quantify the
eects of a hypothetical ban on organophosphate and carbamate insecticides. Although
the Gray and Hammitt study reports the possible impact of such a pesticide ban on the
population's intake of individual nutrients, they do not relate this to an estimate of disease
incidence as we seek to do here. Instead, their ndings report the number of people changing
to a \worse (or better) health state" for each of twenty nutrients.
4 Benets of Fruit and Vegetable Consumption
Numerous health benets have been associated with consuming a diet rich in a wide variety
of fruits and vegetables (Van Duyn and Pivonka, 2000). Scientic evidence is accumulat-
ing for a protective eect for fruits and vegetables in prevention of cancer (Steinmetz and
Potter, 1996; World Cancer Research Fund, 1997), coronary heart disease (Ness and Powles,
1997; Liu, Manson, Lee, Cole, Hennekens, Willett and Buring, 2000; Joshipura, Hu et al.,
2001), ischemic stroke (Joshipura, Ascherio et al., 1999; Feldman, 2001), hypertension (Ap-
pel et al., 1997), diabetes mellitus (Ford and Mokdad, 2001), chronic obstructive pulmonaryHealth Tradeos in Pesticide Regulation 7
disease (Miedema, Feskens, Heederik and Kromhout, 1993), and diverticulosis (Aldoori, Gio-
vannucci, Wing, Trichopoulos and Willett, 1994; Aldoori, Giovannucci, Rockett, Sampson,
Rimm and Willett, 1998). The level of protection suggested by these studies is often quite
dramatic. A recent review of several studies found that \the quarter of the population with
the lowest dietary intake of fruits and vegetables compared to the quarter with the highest
intake has roughly twice the cancer rate for most types of cancer" (Ames, Gold and Willett,
1995).
High consumption of fruits and vegetables (Neumark-Sztainer, Story, Resnick and Blum,
1996; Kahn, Tatham, Rodriguez, Calle, Thun and C.W. Heath, 1997; M uller, Koertringer,
Mast, Languix and Frunch, 1999; Epstein, Gordy, Raynor, Beddome, Kilanowski and Paluch,
2001) or consumption of a wide variety of vegetables (McCrory, Fuss, Saltzman and Roberts,
2000) has also been related to a lower prevalence of obesity or reduced weight gain. Further,
evidence suggests that focusing on increasing intake of healthy foods, such as fruits and
vegetables, may be more eective at reducing weight than focusing on decreasing intake of
unhealthy foods, such as high fat and high sugar items (Epstein et al., 2001). Taken together,
the evidence on consumption patterns and health benets supports interventions to increase
consumption of a wide variety of fruits and vegetables.
Compared to studies of general fruit and vegetable consumption, the results of studies of
the benets of specic nutrients to reduction of cancer and other health risks have been less
uniform and conclusive. In their review of the literature of risk factors for cancer, Ames et al.
(1995) explain that although \antioxidants in fruits and vegetables may account for a good
part of their benecial eect ... [it is] dicult to disentagle by epidemiological studies [these
eects] from other important vitamins and ingredients in fruits and vegetables." Fruit and
vegetable ber intake have also proven to be important factors for reducing the incidence of
certain diseases (Rimm et al., 1996). Such considerations suggest that individuals' aggregate
intake of fruits and vegetables is an appropriate level of analysis for investigating health
outcomes.Health Tradeos in Pesticide Regulation 8
5 Price Impacts of Pesticide Regulation
Banning the use of a pesticide is likely to increase the prices consumers face for fruits and
vegetables. Prot-maximizing farmers tend to use the most eective and least costly pes-
ticides. If a used input is no longer available, the productions costs will probably increase.
Such increases \are passed on to consumers to whatever degree the market will bear" (Ral-
ston, 1999). Furthermore, if overall yields go down, the resulting supply shift also causes an
increase in the market price to consumers.
Table 2: Simulated Impacts of a Pesticide Ban on Five California Crops
Crop Impact Output Change (%) Price Change (%) Consumer Spending
Almonds Mean -15 21 -94
High -34 59 -256
Grapes Mean -19 29 -358
High -52 87 -1031
Lettuce Mean -9 57 -321
High -28 175 -931
Oranges Mean -21 13 -53
High -41 29 -114
Strawberries Mean -25 18 -57
High -53 37 -114
Consumer spending is in hundred thousands of 1990 dollars. The high impact estimate is the value which may be exceeded
with a 5% probability (Zilberman et al., 1991).
Several studies have investigated the potential cost to consumers of pesticide regulations.
In a 1991 Science article, Zilberman et al. (1991) investigated the potential impacts of \Big
Green," a failed California ballot initiative that sought to phase out all food-use pesticides
known to cause cancer or reproductive damage. Their results for ve California crops are
presented in Table 2. A similar investigation of the impacts of a complete nationwide pes-
ticide ban on major commodities found price increases could range as high as 83% for rice,
100% for soybeans, and 146% for peanuts (Knutson, Taylor, Pensen and Smith, 1990). Even
less dramatic pesticide bans can have signicant impacts. A recent study of the eects of
banning organophosphate and carbamate pesticides, currently under review by EPA, pre-Health Tradeos in Pesticide Regulation 9
dicts price increases of 5.02% for tomatoes, 4.17% for fruit juice, and 6.24% for apples (Taylor
and Smith, 1999).
6 Indirect Health Eects of Food Quality Regulation
Consider a regulator that is focusing on only one source of risk to the public health. Such a
regulator may adopt or modify an environmental policy Q to reduce cancer risk from intake of
pesticide-contaminated crops by a factor of 1 in l exposed individuals, i.e., for every l people
in the population consuming fruit and vegetables, one case of cancer will be prevented. In a
population of N exposed individuals, this policy change should prevent N
l cases of cancer.
If the policy also raises consumer prices of fruits and vegetables, there may be counter-
vailing risks, such as increased likelihood of ischemic stroke, that aect the target population.








where Zi is a vector of other factors in
uencing stroke risk.
























Summing over all diseases of interest gives us the total mortality oset for the policy change.
Note that the expression given in (2) relies on two further assumptions. The rst is that
the policy in question does not aect the price of other foods. Perhaps more realistically,
we can use the same formulation by standardizing pof to be unity. The other assumption is
that the change in policy does not shift consumers' demand for fruits and vegetables. If we
are considering marginal changes in pesticide policy and consumers that have already beenHealth Tradeos in Pesticide Regulation 10
conditioned by thirty years of modern pesticide regulation, this does not seem unreasonable.
Most consumers are also unaware of specic regulatory actions.2 Furthermore, one could
argue that since there exists a market for foods produced without the use of pesticides, the
consumers most likely to respond to a small change in pesticide policy have already sorted
themselves out of the conventional produce market.
7 Methodology and Data
This study involves a series of policy simulations designed to quantify some of the coun-
tervailing health risks that may result from pesticide regulation. The initial element in
each simulation is the hypothetical ban of a pesticide or class of pesticides that results in a
broad-based increase in the market price of fruits and vegetables. The change in the intake
levels of a sample population of consumers is then calculated. Finally, the dietary changes
in the sample are related to a dose-response function to yield the increased health risk and
corresponding incidence in the population of coronary heart disease and ischemic stroke.
Coronary heart disease and ischemic stroke were chosen for inclusion in this analysis
for two reasons. First, they are two of the major causes of death in the United States.
They were also the subject of two extensive studies (Joshipura et al., 2001; Joshipura et
al., 1999) conducted by Harvard researchers and published in major medical journals in
the last three years. These studies were based upon large panel surveys of over 110,000
medical professionals, with 8 years of follow-up for men and 14 years of follow-up for women.
These studies divide the sample populations into quintiles of fruit and vegetable consumption
and then calculate the relative risk of the disease of interest for members of each quintile,
controlling for factors such as age, smoking status, alcohol intake, family history, weight,
2For example, on October 31, 2001, EPA announced the cancellation of several uses of two organophos-
phate pesticides, phosmet and azinphos-methyl. Three crop uses of phosmet are being cancelled voluntarily.
Twenty-eight uses of azinphos-methyl are being cancelled, and seven more uses are being phased out over the
next four years (Breen, 2001). The authors learned of these cancellations through a trade publication with
a very limited audience, and could not nd reference to EPA's action in any major news source, including
CNN.com, the New York Times, the Washington Post, or the Associated Press newswire service.Health Tradeos in Pesticide Regulation 11
supplement use, and exercise level. These studies provide strong evidence that relative risk
decreases as fruit and vegetable consumption increases. For example, men in the highest
quintile had 20% less risk of coronary heart disease, and 39% less risk of ischemic stroke,
than men in the lowest quintile. Joshipura et al. also break their ndings down by broad
categories of fruit and vegetable type. The ndings for dierences in consumption of all
fruits and vegetables are further summarized in Table 3 below.
Table 3: Relative Risk of Ischemic Stroke and Coronary Heart Disease, by Quintile of Fruit
and Vegetable Intake and per Serving per Day
1st Quintile 3rd Quintile 5th Quintile 1 Serving/Day
Ischemic Stroke
Women 1.0 0.75 0.74 0.93
Men 1.0 0.70 0.61 0.96
Pooled 1.0 0.73 0.69 0.94
Coronary Heart Disease
Women 1.0 0.88 0.80 0.97
Men 1.0 0.95 0.80 0.96
Pooled 1.0 0.92 0.80 0.96
Risks by quintile of intake are relative to the risk for the lowest quintile of intake, and are adjusted for age, smoking status,
alcohol intake, family history of myocardial infarction, body mass index, vitamin supplement use, vitamin E use, physical
activity, aspirin use, hypertension, hypercholesterolemia, total energy intake, and postmenopausal hormone use (among women).
One serving per day is risk reduction per one-serving increment, using median values for the quintile of intake (Joshipura et
al., 1999; Joshipura et al., 2001).
As noted above, aggregate intake of fruit and vegetables is an appropriate level of analysis
for considering health outcomes. These studies allow for the calculation of dose-response
functions describing the increase in specic health risks resulting from reduced consumption
of broad categories of fruits and vegetables, including all fruits and vegetables, all fruits, all
vegetables, total citrus fruits, citrus fruit juices, cruciferous vegetables, green leafy vegetables,
etc. In contrast, the literature relating intake of specic nutrients to the incidence of diseases
is neither complete nor uniform enough to apply it to overall dietary patterns.
The reported results from these studies suggest that the relative risk curves generally
follows a log-linear shape. Using these reported results, we estimated parameterized curves
for use in our simulations. When calibrated to an appropriate set of baseline risks for theHealth Tradeos in Pesticide Regulation 12
control group (here, the observed incidence for the quintile with the lowest consumption of
fruits and vegetables), the relative risk curves yield dose-response functions for the protective
benets of fruit and vegetable consumption. The results that we report in Section 8 below
are to be considered preliminary because of the limited number of observations that were
used to calculate these curves.3
In order to quantify the health outcomes from dietary changes resulting from federal
policies, it is necessary to have information on the consumption habits of a representative
sample of the population. The sample population used in our study is the 18,081 individuals
over the age of two included in the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Continuing Study of
Food Intakes by Individuals (CSFII) for 1994-1996 and 1998 (United States Department of
Agriculture, 2000a). The CSFII comes with a set of sampling weights that allows extrapola-
tion of our analysis to the entire U.S. population, i.e., 253.9 million people over two years of
age. CSFII data include detailed information on individual food and nutrient intake, dietary
knowledge, attitude, and behavior, and household demographics. A set of \cookbooks" avail-
able from USDA was used to convert the consumption data in the CSFII to food pyramid
servings (United States Department of Agriculture, 2000b).
The consumption response of the individuals in the sample to the simulated changes
in the price of fruits and vegetables is described by demand elasticities, which give the
percentage change in quantity demanded for a one-percent change in price. Here we used
recent elasticities for fruit and vegetable consumption calculated by researchers at the U.S.
Department of Agriculture, shown in Table 4 below (Huang and Lin, 2000). These elasticities
are particularly appropriate for this study as they are segmented by income level, and were
calculated from a earlier survey similar in format to the CSFII.
3It is our intention to more accurately estimate the dose-response functions by obtaining the complete
underlying data used in these medical studies. Nevertheless, we do not anticipate that the nal results will
change drastically. The main advantage of a formal estimation based upon the underlying data is that it
will allow for simulation of meaningful condence intervals based upon the likely variation in individuals'
dose-response relationships.Health Tradeos in Pesticide Regulation 13
Table 4: Own-Price Demand Elasticities by Income Group
Commodity All Incomes Low Income Medium Income High Income
Fruit -0.7196 -0.6472 -0.6614 - 0.7523
(0.0282) (0.0693) (0.0469) (0.0409)
Vegetables -0.7238 -0.6965 -0.7436 -0.7087
(0.0179) (0.0391) (0.0301) (0.0272)
Juice -1.0109 -1.0498 -0.8997 -1.0387
(0.0364) (0.0837) (0.0591) (0.0563)
Low income refers to families below 130% of the poverty income guidelines, and high income households are above 300 percent
of this level. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. (Huang and Lin, 2000)
8 Preliminary Results
In order to be able to calculate health outcomes, we are constrained by the methodology and
scope of the medical literature. As a result, our simulations are limited to changes in the
price of broad categories of produce. This means we can not estimate the health outcomes
resulting from a pesticide ban that, for example, causes a three percent change in the price
of certain tomato varieties but impacts no other crops. Nonetheless, there are pesticide
regulations under consideration by EPA, such as the current review of all organophosphate
and carbamate chemicals, that would impact the price of fruits and vegetables generally,
as noted in section 5 above. Moreover, it should be noted that the pesticide programs
keep many new substances from being introduced to agricultural production. The exercise
conducted here would apply equally to any price-reducing innovation that is not adopted
because of regulator concerns regarding human cancer risk.
The results reported in Table 5 below describe the health outcomes of a pesticide can-
cellation that causes a lasting average one percent increase in the price of all fruits, all
vegetables, or all fruits and vegetables. By \lasting" we mean a change in price that persists
at least as long as the study period of the medical research used in the simulations. The
number of induced diseases reported is the mean from an extensive series of Monte Carlo
trials. Standard errors re
ect the likely variations in individuals' economic responses to the
price change. In each trial, every individual in the sample was assigned a dierent elastic-Health Tradeos in Pesticide Regulation 14
ity drawn from the distribution implied by Huang and Lin's ndings. Health outcomes are
shown for the entire population, as well as by income group.
Table 5: Cases of Coronary Heart Disease and Ischemic Stroke Induced in the U.S. Population
by a 1% Price Increase in All Fruits, All Vegetables, or All Fruits and Vegetables
Disease All Incomes Low Income Medium Income High Income
All Fruits
Coronary Heart Disease 1,442 231 422 789
(51.06) (23.80) (26.02) (36.65)
Ischemic Stroke 744 132 225 386
(29.90) (14.30) (16.42) (20.39)
Total 2,186 363 648 1,175
(72.11) (33.98) (37.93) (50.65)
All Vegetables
Coronary Heart Disease 2,950 528 1,008 1,414
(53.62) (23.01) (29.70) (38.20)
Ischemic Stroke 1,482 285 507 690
(32.04) (13.56) (18.07) (22.73)
Total 4,433 813 1,516 2,104
(82.60) (35.23) (46.14) (58.72)
All Fruits and Vegetables
Coronary Heart Disease 6,904 1,152 2,260 3,492
(119.64) (53.28) (63.63) (85.58)
Ischemic Stroke 3,022 568 997 1,457
(58.78) (26.24) (32.81) (41.06)
Total 9,926 1,720 3,257 4,949
(160.44) (71.50) (86.80) (113.68)
Results reported are the simulation means and standard errors (in parentheses) from a series of Monte Carlo trials (n=100,000).
Low income refers to families below 130% of the poverty income guidelines, and high income households are above 300 percent
of this level. Number of cases across income groups may not sum perfectly to amount shown in \all income" column because
of rounding.
For a one percent increase in the average price of all fruits and vegetables, the simulations
indicate an increase of 6,904 cases of coronary heart disease and 3,022 ischemic strokes. In
order to oset these 9,926 cases in a population of 253.9 million people, a pesticide action
would have to prevent 1 in 25,580 cancers. This is almost four times as protective as the
mean risk of pesticide uses that were banned between 1975 and 1989 (Van Houtven and
Cropper, 1996).
As described above, EPA bases its regulatory decisions on increases in cancer risk overHealth Tradeo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a lifetime of exposure. Here we have used the number of incidences of ischemic stroke and
coronary heart disease observed during the duration of the Joshipura studies as our base-
line. It is certain that a substantial number of the participants in these studies experienced
ischemic stroke or coronary heart disease since the study period ended, or will do so in the
future. Since our baseline risk is not calculated on a lifetime basis, the quantities calculated
in these simulations are likely to be under-estimates. These numbers also do not re
ect a
complete accounting of all negative health outcomes, but just those from two major causes
of death. Furthermore, recall that EPA extrapolates risk estimates from animals studies
by incorporating an arbitrary safety factor. Taken together, it seems quite likely that some
pesticide regulatory actions will harm more people than they protect.
It is also of interest to examine the income distribution of these induced morbidities and
mortalities. This focus is not just of theoretical interest but is also supported by language
in the FQPA, which charges federal regulators with considering \dietary consumption pat-
terns and variations in the sensitivities of major identiable subpopulations" (United States
Environmental Protection Agency, Oce of Pesticide Programs, 1999). If we assume that
the linear dose-response function used by EPA for calculating dietary cancer risk are correct,
we nd that the people saved from reducing dietary exposure to carcinogens tend to have
higher incomes (as they are consuming more fresh fruits and vegetables, and therefore have
greater exposure). For example, if we assumed that the simulated policy involves no net
loss of lives { i.e., total cancer deaths exactly equal the number of induced negative health
outcomes { we nd that for a one percent change in the price of all fruits and vegetables, ap-
proximately 275 high income cancer cases are shifted to low and medium income consumers.
Other distributional eects of such a \break-even" policy are shown in Table 6 below.Health Tradeo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Table 6: Distribution of Avoided Cancers in a Break-Even Scenario for a 1% Price Increase
in All Fruits, All Vegetables, or All Fruits and Vegetables
Health Outcome All Incomes Low Income Medium Income High Income
All Fruits
Cancers Avoided 2,186 354 682 1,151
Cases Induced 2,186 363 648 1,175
Change 0 + 9 - 34 + 24
All Vegetables
Cancers Avoided 4,433 717 1,383 2,333
Cases Induced 4,433 813 1,516 2,104
Change 0 + 96 + 133 - 229
All Fruits and Vegetables
Cancers Avoided 9,926 1,606 3,096 5,223
Cases Induced 9,926 1,720 3,257 4,949
Change 0 + 114 + 161 - 274
\Cancers Avoided" calculated assuming a linear dose-response function for cancer. \Cases Induced" is the total of ischemic
stroke and coronary heart disease from Table 5. Columns may not sum perfectly due to rounding.
9 Conclusions
The regulation of pesticides to prevent cancer from dietary exposure to carcinogens involves
risk tradeos which should be taken into consideration. We have illustrated that certain
plausible regulatory scenarios will lead to increased incidence of common health problems
resulting from decreased fruit and vegetable consumption. Some regulations may result in a
shifting of health risks from certain classes of consumers to others. Furthermore, the overall
eect of some pesticide bans is that more lives may be lost than saved.
The argument presented here should not be taken to be anti-organic, or even pro-
pesticide. The authors are among those who, everything being equal, would prefer to con-
sume fewer pesticide residues in their own diets. Yet an overly protective focus on cancer risk
from pesticide residues that ignores countervailing health risks is misguided, as the net eect
on public health may be negative. This is even more poignant when you consider that certain
pesticide uses have been cancelled by the EPA on the basis of consumer risks that were less
than one in a million over a lifetime of exposure { the same amount of incremental annual
risk you incur of suering a fatal accident from spending six minutes in canoe or travellingHealth Tradeos in Pesticide Regulation 17
150 miles by car (Wilson, 1979). It is also worth noting that cancer risk is a poor proxy
for other concerns involved in agricultural pesticide use. Banning uses on the basis of over-
estimates of cancer risk does little to protect consumers from possible endocrine disruption
or neurological eects, prevent human health risks from contamination of water supplies, or
guarantee ecological health. In fact, banning a pesticide on the basis of human cancer risk
may even increase the damage to animals, drinking water systems, etc., as the replacement
pesticides may be hazardous in those respects but exhibit minimal human carcinogenicity.
We also believe there are other applications of this analysis in considering the health
implications of a wide variety of government policies. Any policy that aects the price
of fruits and vegetables is likely to in
uence consumption behavior and, ultimately, public
health. These simulations could be used to model the indirect impacts of other food quality
regulations, trade restrictions, and farm price supports.
It is interesting to consider the existing policy debate surrounding the framework adopted
here. In recent years a highly politicized debate over \risk tradeo analysis" has emerged.
The recent controversy over the appointment of John Graham, one of the authors cited above,
as Administrator of the Federal Oce of Information and Regulatory Aairs highlighted
some of these disagreements. On one extreme are anti-regulatory ideologues who cite any
example of risk tradeos as a general indictment of government intervention in the areas of
health and environment. At the other pole are those who will not accept that the existence
of any level of harm or risk can be socially optimal.
The objective analyst presumably operates between these two extremes. Regulatory
tradeos are perhaps inevitable and their mere existence should not paralyze regulation; the
use of pesticides involve signicant externalities that justify government involvement. Yet
a social optimum can not be achieved if countervailing risks posed by regulations designed
to protect human health are ignored. It is certainly possible to conceive of some policies
that are more eective than others. Our goal here has been to illustrate how great the
tradeos in current pesticide policy may be. We also hope that, as the role that diet plays inHealth Tradeos in Pesticide Regulation 18
human health becomes better understood, EPA will apply models similar to ours to provide
guidance in future regulatory decisions.
As mentioned above, we consider these results to be preliminary. We wish to expand this
work by revisiting the data underlying the medical studies used here. This will allow for the
estimation of more accurate dose-response curves and condence intervals that can be incor-
porated into the Monte Carlo trials performed here to better account for uncertainty. We
would also like to extend the sensitivity analyses to cover measurement error in consumption
or income. Finally, it would be of interest to investigate the distribution of health impacts
over region and ethnic group as well as income level.
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